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Abstract
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement
of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small
group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in
a population engaged in symmetric bimatrix game of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Secondly we show that in an asymmetric quantum game between two players
an ESS pair can be made to appear or disappear by resorting to entangled or
unentangled initial states used to play the game even when the strategy pair
remains a Nash equilibrium in both forms of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined by Maynard smith and
price (1973) [1] with the motivation that a population playing the ESS can withstand a small,
invading group. This concept was developed by combining ingredients from game theory and
from some work on the evolution of the sex ratio. Maynard Smith considers a population
in which members are matched randomly in pairs to play a bimatrix game. The players are
anonymous, that is any pair of players plays the same symmetric bimatrix game and the
players are identical with respect to their set of strategies and their payoff function. From
the symmetry of the bimatrix game it is meant that for strategy set S the payoff of the first
player when he plays A ∈ S and his opponent plays B ∈ S is same as the payoff of the second
player when the latter plays A and the first player plays B. A population which adopts an
ESS can withstand a small invading group [1–3]. An evolutionarily game means a model of
strategic interaction continuing over time in which higher payoff strategies gradually displace
strategies with lower payoffs. There is also some inertia involved in distinguishing between
evolutionarily and revolutionary changes; here inertia means that aggregate behavior does
not change too abruptly.
In a recent publication, Meyer [4] examined game theory from a quantum perspective
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and showed that a player can enhance his expected payoff by implementing a quantum
strategy. Shortly afterwards, Eisert et al [5] investigated the quantization of nonzero sum
game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), and showed that, if quantum strategies are admitted,
the dilemma no longer exists; moreover, they succeeded in constructing a particular quantum
strategy which will always outmaneuver any classical strategy. Referring to Dawkins’ ‘Selfish
Gene’[6], these authors also hinted that games of survival are being played already on the
molecular level, where quantum mechanics dictates the rules. Coming back to the concept of
an ESS we notice that it was perhaps introduced into classical game theory for two reasons:
1. Two player games can have multiple Nash equilibria (NE).
2. Population biology problems can be modelled with the help of this concept.
The reasons for claim that (1) holds for quantum as well as classical games are not far
from obvious. In our opinion even the reason (2) may have a meaning in quantum setting.
In section (ii) of this paper it is our purpose to take up the idea that ‘games of survival
are played at molecular level’ and see what happens when ‘mutants’ of ESS theory come up
with quantum strategies and try to invade classical ESS. What happens if such an invasion
is successful and a new ESS is established; an ESS that is quantum in nature? Suppose
afterwards another small group of ‘mutants’ appear equipped with some other quantum
strategy. Would it be successful now to invade the quantum ESS? These questions have
been considered in section (ii) for the pairwise symmetric game of PD.
We are trying to extend an idea originally proposed for problems in population biology
to quantum domain and it needs more substantive evidence than we have provided. Our
motivation is to look for the consequences when quantum strategies that Eisert et al have
called one and two-parameter quantum strategies satisfy the criteria of an ESS. Later we
also consider NE and ESS’s in the PD game when it is played via another scheme proposed
recently by Marinatto and Weber [13].
PD is a symmetric game and the payoff to a player depends only on player’s strategy
not on player’s identity. In section (iii) we consider quantization of a general 2 × 2 matrix
game in asymmetric form played via Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. In evolutionary game
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theory an ESS for such a game is a strategy pair that forms a strict Nash equilibrium (NE)
[11].We also search what should exactly be the initial entangled state to play a quantum
game when a particular strategy pair is a NE in both the classical and quantum versions of
the game but an ESS in only version.
II. SYMMETRIC CASE
The PD game has classical available pure strategies Cooperation (C) and Defection (D)
[7]. An interesting question is which strategies are likely to be stable and persistent in a
population engaged in the pairwise version of the game. A simple analysis [8] show that D
will be the pure classical strategy prevalent in the population and hence the classical ESS.
In general, suppose that a strategy A is played by almost all members of the population,
the rest of the population form a small group of mutants playing strategy B constitute a
fraction ǫ of the total population. The strategy A is said to be evolutionarily stable (ES) [9]
against B if P [A, (1−ǫ)A+ ǫB] > P [B, (1−ǫ)A+ ǫB] where P [A,B] is defined as the payoff
to player playing A against player playing B, for all sufficiently small, positive ǫ.There exists
some ǫ0, such that for ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0) the inequality is satisfied [9]. If for the given A and B the
ǫ0 specified is as large as possible the ǫ0 is called the “invasion barrier”. If B comes at a
frequency larger than ǫ0 it will lead to an invasion.
For a symmetric bimatrix game it follows [8,9] that A is an ESS with respect to B
1. If P [A,A] > P [B,A] and
2. If P [A,A] = P [B,A] then P [A,B] > P [B,B] (1)
If most of the players play A, then almost all potential opponents are A players, so if A
does better against A than B does, B players will be persistent losers as the game evolves.
However, if A and B do equally well against A, then how well the strategies perform against
B becomes important. Therefore, for A to be ES against B the strategy A must then do
better against B than B does against B. Strategy A is an ESS if A is ES against all B 6= A.
For pure strategies A and B (classical as well as quantum) the fitnesses [8] can be defined
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as
W (A) = P (A,A)FA + P (A,B)FB W (B) = P (B,A)FA + P (B,B)FB (2)
Where FA and FB are the classical frequencies of the pure strategies A and B respectively.
A quantum strategy cannot be treated as a probabilistic sum of pure classical strategies
(except under special conditions). Therefore for finding fitness the quantum strategies are
treated as ‘new’ strategies that cannot be reduced to the pure classical strategies.
An ESS is usually considered another refinement of the NE concept. For symmetric
bimatrix games the relationship is described as [11]
△ESS ⊂ △PE ⊂ △NE and △PE 6= Φ where △NE,△PEand △ESSare the sets of sym-
metric NE, symmetric proper equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategies respectively.
Application of quantum theory gives a new set of NE strategies △NEand △ESSmay contain
quantum strategies as well.
We assume the same quantum version of PD game as described by Eisert et al [5] between
two players. A pair of qubits are prepared in unentangled state |CC〉 and sent through the
entangling gate Ĵ . Ĵ is essentially a unitary operator known to both players and is symmetric
with respect to the interchange of two players. The two players, call them Alice and Bob,
then apply their local unitary operators UA and UB respectively. An inverse gate to Ĵ is
applied before the final measurement by the arbiter. Let sA and sB be Alice’s and Bob’s
strategies respectively. The payoff matrix is the same as chosen by Eisert et al [5] and can
be written as
 (3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)

 (3)
Suppose the players apply their respective strategies sA and sB. These strategies are
unitary operators at player’s disposal i.e. sA˜UA and sA˜UB.If initial state is maximally
entangled state ρ then the final state[4] is
σ = (UA ⊗ UB)ρ(UA ⊗ UB)† (4)
The arbiter applies Kraus operators [4,10] on σ
πCC = |ψCC〉 〈ψCC | πCD = |ψCD〉 〈ψCD|
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πDC = |ψDC〉 〈ψDC | πDD = |ψDD〉 〈ψDD| (5)
The expected payoffs to Alice and Bob are [4]
PA,B = [PCC ]A,Btr[πCCσ] + [PCD]A,Btr[πCDσ]
+[PDC ]A,Btr[πDCσ] + [PDD]A,Btr[πDDσ] (6)
Because the game is symmetric we define P (C,D) as the payoff to C player against D
player. Similarly P (D,C) is defined. The subscripts of A and B are not required.
Eisert et al [4] have used following matrix representations of the unitary operators of one
and two-parameter strategies respectively.
U(θ)=

 cos (θ/2) sin (θ/2)
- sin (θ/2) cos (θ/2)

 U(θ, φ) =

e
iφ cos (θ/2) sin (θ/2)
- sin (θ/2) e−iφ cos (θ/2)

 (7)
Where θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2]. The classical pure strategies C and D are realized
as C˜U(0), D˜U(π) respectively for one-parameter strategies and C˜U(0, 0), D˜U(π, 0)
respectively for two-parameter strategies. We consider three cases:
A. A small group of mutants appear equipped with one-parameter quantum strategy
U(θ) when D exists as a classical ESS.
B. The mutants are equipped with two-parameter quantum strategy U(θ, φ) against
classical ESS.
C. The mutants have successfully invaded and a two-parameter quantum strategy
Q˜U(0, π/2) has established itself as a new quantum ESS. Again another small group of
mutants appear using some other two-parameter quantum strategy and try to invade the
quantum ESS Q.
Case A
The expected payoffs are found as
P (θ,D) = sin2(θ/2)
P (θ, θ) = 2 cos2(θ/2) + 5 cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2) + 1
P (D, θ) = 5 cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (D,D) = 1 (8)
Where, for example P (θ,D) is the payoff to mutant employing one-parameter strategy
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θ against the opponent using D. Now P (D,D) > P (θ,D) for all θ ∈ [0, π). Hence, the
first condition for an ESS is satisfied and D˜U(π) is an ESS. The case θ = π corresponds to
the case when one-parameter mutant strategy coincides with the ESS and is ruled out. If
D˜U(π) is played by almost all the members of the population, which correspond to high
frequency FD for D, we have then W (D) > W (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, π). Therefore the fitness of a
one-parameter quantum strategy, which also corresponds to the case of mixed (randomized)
classical strategies [4], cannot be greater than that of a classical ESS. A one-parameter
quantum strategy, therefore, cannot succeed to invade a classical ESS.
Case B
The expected payoffs are
P (D,D) = 1
P (D,U) = 5 cos2(φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (U,D) = 5 sin2(φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
P (U, U) = 3 |cos(2φ) cos2(θ/2)|2 + 5 cos2(θ/2) sin2(θ/2) |sin(φ)− cos(φ)|2
+
∣∣sin(2φ) cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)∣∣2 (9)
Here P (D,D) > P (U,D) if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) and if P (D,D) = P (U,D) then P (D,U) >
P (U, U). Therefore D is an ESS if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) otherwise the strategy U(θ, φ) will be in
position to invade D. Alternatively if most of the members of the population play D˜U(π, 0),
meaning high frequency FD for D, then the fitnessW (D) will remain greater than the fitness
W [U(θ, φ)] if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5). For φ > arcsin(1/
√
5) the strategy U(θ, φ) can invade the
strategy D which is an ESS. The possession of a richer strategy by the mutants in this case
leads to an invasion of D when φ > arcsin(1/
√
5). Mutants having access to richer strategies
may seem non-judicious but even in classical setting an advantage by the mutants leading
to invasion may be seen in similar context.
Case C
Eisert et al [4] showed that the quantum strategy Q˜U(0, π/2) played by both the players
is the unique NE and one player cannot gain without lessening the other player’s expected
payoff. The expected payoffs are
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P (Q,Q) = 3
P (U,Q) = [3− 2cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2)
P (Q,U) = [3− 2cos2(φ)] cos2(θ/2) + 5 sin2(θ/2) (10)
Now P (Q,Q) > P (U,Q) holds true for all θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2] except when θ = 0
and φ = π/2 which is the case when the mutant strategy U(θ, φ) is the same as Q and
is ruled out. Therefore the first condition for Q to be an ESS is satisfied. The condition
P (Q,Q) = P (U,Q) implies θ = 0 and φ = π/2. We have again the situation of the mutant
strategy to be same as Q and we neglect it. If Q is played by most of the players, meaning
high frequency FQ for Q, then it is seen that W (Q) > W [U(θ, φ)] for all θ ∈ (0, π]
and φ ∈ [0, π/2). Therefore a two parameter quantum strategy U(θ, φ) cannot invade the
quantum ESS i.e. the strategy Q˜U(0, π/2) for this particular game. The mutants having
access to richer strategy space remains an advantage not any more now. For the population
as well as the mutants Q is the unique NE and ESS of the game.
The invasion of the mutants in case B does not seem so unusual given the richer structure
of strategy space they exploit and they are unable to invade when it doesn’t remain an
advantage and most of the population have access to it.
We now see what happens to PD game when played via Marinatto’s scheme[13]. In this
scheme the players apply their ‘tactics’ by restricting themselves to a probabilistic choice
between the identity operator
uprise
I and the Pauli spin-flip operator
uprise
σx.The purpose [12] for
such a choice as described by the authors is to have the smallest set of operations able to
reproduce, when applied to a factorizeable couple of strategies, the results of the classical
theory of games. However new results come out from the richer structure of the strategic
space, i.e. from the entangled couple of strategies[13]. S.C.Benjamin in his comment [14]
have considered it a severe restriction on the full range of quantum mechanically possible
manipulations but Marinatto and Weber have replied [12] by describing it a ‘minimal’ choice
enough to reproduce the classical results.
For the initial entangled state
|ψin〉 = a |CC〉+ b |DD〉 |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 (11)
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when
uprise
I and
uprise
σx correspond to strategies C and D respectively with the payoff matrix (3).
Payoffs to Alice and Bob are:
PA(p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}
+{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2}
PB(p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2}
+{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2} (12)
where p and q are the probabilities of Alice and Bob respectively to act with the operator
uprise
I . PD is symmetric game and remains symmetric after quantizing it. For a symmetric
bimatrix games an ESS is recognized as a symmetric NE with an additional property usually
called ‘the stability property’[8].
We search for symmetric NE from the inequalities using only the parameter b of the
initial state |ψin〉 because for the state |ψin〉 = a |CC〉+b |DD〉 the game reduces to classical
when |b|2 = 0 i.e. when the initial state becomes unentangled. NE inequalities are then
PA(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PA(p,
⋆
q) = (
⋆
p −p){3 |b|2 − (⋆q +1)} ≥ 0
PB(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PB(
⋆
p, q) = (
⋆
q −q){3 |b|2 − (⋆p +1)} ≥ 0 (13)
The parameters of the initial entangled state a and b may decide some of the possible
NE. Three symmetric NE are
1.
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 0 when 3 |b|2 ≤ 1
2.
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 1 when 3 |b|2 ≥ 2
3.
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 3 |b|2 − 1 when 1 < 3 |b|2 < 2 (14)
The first two NE are independent of the parameters a and b of the initial state. However,
the third NE depends on these. We now ask which of these NE can be ESS’s assuming that
a particular NE exists with reference to a particular set of initial states |ψin〉 for which it
can be found. The payoff to a player using
uprise
I with probability p when the opponent uses
uprise
I
with probability q is
P (p, q) = 3{pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ 5{p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}
+{pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2} (15)
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For the first case
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 0. The payoff P (0, 0) > P (p, 0) when 3 |b|2 < 1 and P (0, 0) =
P (p, 0) imply 3 |b|2 = 1. Also P (q, q) = −q2 + 5
3
(q + 1) and P (0, q) = 5
3
(q + 1). Now
P (0, q) > P (q, q) when q 6= 0.Therefore, ⋆p=⋆q= 0 is an ESS when 3 |b|2 ≤ 1.
Consider
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 1 now. P (1, 1) > P (p, 1) means 3 |b|2 > 2 if p 6= 1. And P (1, 1) = P (p, 1)
means for p 6= 1 we have 3 |b|2 = 2. In such case P (q, q) = −q2 + 1
3
(q + 7) and P (1, q) =
5
3
(2− q). Now P (1, q) > P (q, q) because (1− q)2 > 0 for q 6= 1. Therefore ⋆p=⋆q= 1 is an ESS
when 3 |b|2 ≥ 2.
The third case
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 3 |b|2−1. Here P (3 |b|2−1, 3 |b|2−1) = −36 |b|6+36 |b|4−5 |b|2+6.
Also we find P (p, 3 |b|2 − 1) = −21 |b|4 + 21 |b|2 − 3. Therefore, the condition P (3 |b|2 −
1, 3 |b|2 − 1) > P (p, 3 |b|2 − 1) holds and ⋆p=⋆q= 3 |b|2 − 1 is an ESS too for 1 < 3 |b|2 < 2.
All three possible symmetric NE definable for different ranges of |b|2 turn out ESS’s. Each
of the three sets of initial states |ψin〉 give a unique NE that is an ESS too. Switching from
one to the other sets of initial states also changes the NE and ESS accordingly. A question
rises here: is it possible that a particular NE switches over between ‘ESS’ and ‘not ESS’
when the initial state changes between certain possible choices?. The transition between
classical and quantum game is also controlled by a change in the initial state. For example
classical payoffs can be obtained when the initial state is unentangled. It implies that it
may be possible to switch over between ‘ESS’ and ‘not ESS’ by a change between ‘classical’
and ‘quantum’ forms of a game i.e. when the initial state is unentangled and entangled
respectively. This possibility makes ESS interesting for the quantum game theory as well.
Because PD does not allow such a possibility we now investigate asymmetric games to look
for an answer for our question.
III. ASYMMETRIC CASE
The players are anonymous in a symmetric bimatrix game. Such a game is written
as G = (M,MT ) where M is a square matrix and MT is its transpose. An ESS for an
asymmetric bimatrix game i.e. G = (M,N) when N 6= MT is defined as a strict NE [11].A
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strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) ∈ S, is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Pair of the asymmetric bimatrix
game G = (M,N) if it satisfies the NE conditions with strict inequality i.e.
1. PA(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PA(x,
⋆
y) for all x 6=⋆x
2. PB(
⋆
x,
⋆
y) > PB(
⋆
x, y) for all y 6=⋆y (16)
The game of Battle of Sexes has the following matrix
 (α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)

 where α > β > γ (17)
is an asymmetric bimatrix game with three classical NE [13]
1.
⋆
p1=
⋆
q1= 0
2.
⋆
p2=
⋆
q2= 1
3.
⋆
p3=
α−γ
α+β−2γ
⋆
q3=
β−γ
α+β−2γ
(18)
Here (1) and (2) are ESS’s as well but (3) is not because it is not a strict NE. The
asymmetric quantum game played via the entangled state |ψin〉 = a |OO〉+ b |TT 〉,where O
and T denote ‘Opera’ and ‘Television’ respectively, has following three NE [13].
1.
⋆
p1=
⋆
q1= 1
2.
⋆
p2=
⋆
q2= 0
3.
⋆
p3=
(α−γ)|a|2+(β−γ)|b|2
α+β−2γ
⋆
q3=
(α−γ)|b|2+(β−γ)|a|2
α+β−2γ
(19)
Similar to the classical case, (1) and (2) are ESS’s while (3) is not. These two ESS’s do
not depend on the parameters a and b of the initial state,however, the third NE does so.
We show later that for other games an ESS may also be dependent on the parameters a
and b. Interestingly playing the Battle of Sexes game via another entangled state |ψin〉 =
a |OT 〉+ b |TO〉 changes the scene. The payoffs to Alice and Bob now are:
PA(p, q) =
p
{−q(α + β − 2γ) + α |a|2 + β |b|2 − γ}+ q {α |b|2 + β |a|2 − γ} + γ
PB(p, q) =
q
{−p(α + β − 2γ) + β |a|2 + α |b|2 − γ}+ p{β |b|2 + α |a|2 − γ}+ γ (20)
and there is only one NE that is not an ESS i.e.
⋆
p= β|a|
2+α|b|2−γ
α+β−γ
⋆
q3=
α|a|2+β|b|2−γ
α+β−γ
(21)
11
and Battle of Sexes playing via the state |ψin〉 = a |OT 〉+ b |TO〉 gives no ESS at all.
An essential requirement on a quantum version of a game is that the corresponding clas-
sical game must be its subset. Suppose for a quantum game corresponding to an asymmetric
bimatrix classical game a particular strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) ∈ S is an ESS independent of an
initial state |ψin〉 in its possible choices i.e. (⋆x,
⋆
y) is an ESS for all a and b.Classical game
being a subset of the quantum game the strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) must be an ESS in the classical
game as well. However, a strategy pair (
⋆
x,
⋆
y) being an ESS in the classical game may not
remain an ESS in quantum version. The quantization of an asymmetric classical game can
make disappear the classical ESS’s but cannot make appear new ESS’s, provided an ESS in
quantum version remains so for every possible choice of a and b. However, when an ESS is
defined as a strict NE existing only for a set of initial states for which that NE exists the
statement that quantization can only make disappear classically available ESS’s may not
remain valid. In such a case quantization may make appear new ESS’s definable for certain
ranges of the parameters a and b.To find games with the property that ‘ a particular NE
switches over between ‘ESS’ and ‘not ESS’ when the initial state changes between its pos-
sible choices’ we write down the payoffs to Alice and Bob playing an asymmetric quantum
game via the method [13] of probabilistic choice of the operator
uprise
I by the players. For the
matrix
 (α1, α2) (β1, β2)
(γ1, γ2) (σ1, σ2)

 (22)
with the condition

 α1 β1
γ1 σ1

 6=

 α2 β2
γ2 σ2


T
the payoffs for the initial state |ψin〉 =
a |OO〉+b |TT 〉 are as follows, given that O and T are again the two pure classical strategies
that no more represent ‘Opera’ and ‘Television’ only.
PA(p, q) = α1
{
pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ β1 {p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2}
+γ1
{
p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}+ σ1 {pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2}
PB(p, q) = α2
{
pq |a|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |b|2}+ β2 {p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2}
+γ2
{
p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2}+ σ2 {pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |a|2} (23)
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The NE conditions are then
PA(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PA(p,
⋆
q) =
(
⋆
p −p)
[
|a|2 (β1 − σ1) + |b|2 (γ1 − α1)−
⋆
q {(β1 − σ1) + (γ1 − α1)}
]
≥ 0
PB(
⋆
p,
⋆
q)− PB(
⋆
p, q) =
(
⋆
q −q)
[
|a|2 (γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 (β2 − α2)−
⋆
p {(γ2 − σ2) + (β2 − α2)}
]
≥ 0 (24)
Let now
⋆
p=
⋆
q= 0 be a NE i.e.
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = −p
[
(β1 − σ1) + |b|2 {(γ1 − α1)− (β1 − σ1)}
] ≥ 0
PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = −q
[
(γ2 − σ2) + |b|2 {(β2 − α2)− (γ2 − σ2)}
] ≥ 0 (25)
When the strategy pair (0, 0) is an ESS in the classical game (|b|2 = 0) we should have
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = −p(β1 − σ1) > 0 for all p 6= 0 and
PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = −q(γ2 − σ2) > 0 for all q 6= 0 (26)
It implies (β1 − σ1) < 0 and (γ2 − σ2) < 0.
For the pair (0, 0) to be ‘not ESS’ for some |b|2 6= 0 let take γ1 = α1 and β2 = α2 we have
then
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = −p(β1 − σ1)
{
1− |b|2}
PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = −q(γ2 − σ2)
{
1− |b|2} (27)
And the pair (0, 0) doesn’t remain an ESS when |b|2 = 1. A game with these properties
is given by the matrix
 (1, 1) (1, 2)
(2, 1) (3, 2)

 (28)
For this game the pair (0, 0) is an ESS when |b|2 = 0 (classical game) but it is not when
for example |b|2 = 1
2
, though it remains a NE in both the cases. Therefore, a NE can be
switched between ESS and ‘not ESS’ by adjusting the parameters a and b. An ESS may
also appear when unentangled strategies become entangled opposite to the previous case.
An example of a game for which it happens is
 (2, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 0)

 (29)
Playing this game again via |ψin〉 = a |OO〉+ b |TT 〉 gives following payoff differences for
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the strategy pair (0, 0) for Alice and Bob respectively
PA(0, 0)− PA(p, 0) = p |b|2 and PB(0, 0)− PB(0, q) = q |b|2 (30)
Therefore (29) is an example of a game for which (0, 0) is not an ESS when initial state
in unentangled but (0, 0) is an ESS for entangled initial states i.e. 0 < |b|2 < 1.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that in a population engaged in symmetric bimatrix classical game of
Prisoner’s Dilemma an invasion of classical ESS is possible rather easily by the mutants
exploiting two-parameter set of quantum strategies. However, the mutants cannot invade
when they are deprived of using entanglement or when entanglement doesn’t remain an
advantage. For an asymmetric quantum game between two players we have shown that a
strategy pair can be made an ESS for either classical (using unentangled |ψin〉) or quantum
(using entangled |ψin〉) version of the game even when the strategy pair remains a Nash
equilibrium in both the versions. It shows that in certain types of games entanglement can
be used to make appear or disappear ESS’s while retaining corresponding Nash equilibria.
The notion of an ESS in multiplayer classical games have been used in classical game
theory. Recently S.C.Benjamin [15] have shown that coherent equilibria of mostly cooper-
ative nature can exist in multiplayer quantum games. We think that ESS can be useful
refinement concept in multiplayer quantum games having multiple NE and entanglement
can also be related to ESS’s in these games as well.
V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
One of us (A.I) is grateful to Pakistan Institute of Lasers and Optics, Islamabad, for
support. We are obliged to R. Naqvi for improving the text of the paper.
14
VI. REFERENCES
[1] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G.R. (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246,
15-18
[2] Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. CUP.
[3] Grafen, A (1990) Biological signals as handicaps. J. Theor. Bio. 144, 517-546
[4] D.Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1052 (1999) and quant-ph/0004092
[5] J.Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999) and
quant-ph/0004076
[6] R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976).
[7] R.B. Myerson, Game Theory: An Analysis of Conflict (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1991).
[8] Game Theory, A report by K. Prestwich, Department of Biology, College of the Holy
Cross, Worcester, MA, USA 01610. 1999.
[9] Evolution in knockout conflicts. A report by M.Broom, Center for Statistics and
Stochastic Modeling, School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Sussex, U.K. September
17, 1997.
[10] States, Effects, and Operations: Fundamental Notions of Quantum Theory, by
K.Kraus. Lecture Notes in Physics, Vol. 190. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1983).
[11] Evolutionary game theory and the Modelling of Economic Behaviour, by Gerard van
der Laan and Xander Tieman. November 6, 1996. Research Program ”Competition and
Cooperation” of the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Free University, Amsterdam.
[12] Reply to “Comment on: A Quantum Approach to Static Games of Complete Infor-
mation” quant-ph/0009103
[13] A Quantum Approach to Static Games of Complete Information. Phys. Lett, 272,
291 (2000);
[14] Comment on: “A quantum approach to static games of complete information”
quant-ph/0008127
15
[15] Multiplayer Quantum Games. quant-ph/0007038
16
